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IN

THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

STATE OF IDAHO,

)
)

Plaintiff-Respondent,

)
)

V.

NO. 47186-2019

)

Minidoka County No.
CR-34-18-1515

)

DENIS LOPEZ SERRANO,

)

RESPONDENT’ S BRIEF

)

Defendant-Appellant.

)
)

Has Lopezl failed t0 show that the district court abused its sentencing discretion when it
imposed a ﬁxed-life sentence for second-degree murder, a consecutive 25-year ﬁxed sentence for
second-degree kidnapping, and a concurrent 5-year ﬁxed sentence for aggravated assault upon
Lopez’s guilty pleas to those charges?

1

The

state refers

Appellant’s brief.

t0

(E

Denis Lopez Serrano as “Lopez” in
generally Appellant’s brief.)

this brief,

as

Lopez did

in his

ARGUMENT
Lopez Has Failed Show That The
A.

District

Court Abused

Its

Sentencing Discretion

Introduction

On April
a child in

28, 2018,

Lopez shot Nallely Vargas

common; and murdered Rafael Vargas,

Juarez, his eX-girlfriend with

Whom he has

Nallely’s father. (PSI, pp.23-24.2)

Lopez then

got into Nallely’s car, drove Nallely and Vargas east of Minidoka, and told Nallely that he

going t0

dump

her father’s body and then

Nallely convinced

him

Nallely agree not to

t0 drive

tell

father

was

The

the police

what happened, and told her

At

(1d,)

life-ﬂighted t0 Pocatello

state

(PSI, p.24.)

After Lopez stopped the car,

towards the hospital and allow her t0

her family if she said anything.

Her

kill her.

the hospital, Nallely

Where he

call

91

1.

that his friend

was

(1d,)

would

Lopez made
kill

her and

treated for her injury.

(Id.)

died. (Id.)

charged Lopez With ﬁrst-degree murder, aggravated assault, two counts 0f ﬁrst-

degree kidnapping, and the ﬁrearm sentencing enhancement. (R. V01.
t0 a plea agreement,

Lopez pled

guilty to

I,

pp.1 15-1 19.) —Pursuant

amended charges of second-degree murder and second-

degree kidnapping; aggravated assault, and the sentencing enhancement. (R. V01.

ﬂ

was

generally 12/20/18 Tr.)

The

(5/1/19 TL, p.185, Ls.16-19.)

state

recommended

I,

pp.152-155;

a ﬁxed-life sentence on the murder charge.

After a lengthy sentencing hearing, the district court imposed a

uniﬁed ﬁxed-life sentence for second-degree murder, a consecutive 25-year ﬁxed sentence for

2

Page numbers 0f the “PSI” refer

PSI.

t0 the

page numbers 0f the electronic

PDF

ﬁle containing the

second-degree kidnapping, and a concurrent ﬁxed ﬁve-year sentence for aggravated assault. (R.,
V01.

II,

pp.15-19; 5/1/19 T11, p.286, L.6

On

appeal,

Lopez

— p.290,

L.24.)

asserts that the sentences

imposed by the

district court

were excessive.

(Appellant’s brief, pp. 3-10.) However, a review of the record supports the sentences imposed.

Standard

B.

Of Review

The length of a sentence

is

reviewed under an abuse 0f discretion standard considering

State V. Oliver, 144 Idaho 722, 726, 170 P.3d 387, 391 (2007)

the defendant’s entire sentence.

137 Idaho 457, 460, 50 P.3d 472, 475 (2002); State

(citing State V. Strand,

Huffman, 144

V.

Idaho 201, 159 P.3d 838 (2007)).

Where

a

sentence

demonstrating that

it is

is

within

statutory

limits,

a clear abuse of discretion.

bears

appellant

the

the

burden 0f

State V. Baker, 136 Idaho 576, 577,

614, 615 (2001) (citing State V. Lundquist, 134 Idaho 831, 11 P.3d 27 (2000)).

38 P.3d

The abuse 0f

discretion test looks to Whether the district court: “(1) correctly perceived the issue as one of

of its discretion;

discretion; (2) acted Within the outer boundaries

legal standards applicable to the speciﬁc choices available t0

the exercise 0f reason.”

Lunneborg

V.

MV

Fun

it;

(3) acted consistently

and

(4)

reached

Life, 163 Idaho 856, 863,

its

With the

decision

by

421 P.3d 187, 194

(2018).

C.

The

District

To bear
that,

Court Acted Well Within

Its

Sentencing Discretion

the burden 0f demonstrating an abuse of discretion, the appellant

under any reasonable View 0f the

facts, the

sentence

was

excessive.

must

establish

State V. Farwell, 144

T0

Idaho 732, 736, 170 P.3d 397, 401 (2007).

establish that the sentence

appellant must demonstrate that reasonable minds

was

excessive, the

could not conclude the sentence was

appropriate t0 accomplish the sentencing goals of protecting society, deterrence, rehabilitation,

and

retribution.

Fallen, 144 Idaho

at

A

736, 170 P.3d at 401.

sentence

is

reasonable “‘if

it

appears necessary t0 accomplish the primary objective of protecting society and t0 achieve any
or

all

of the related goals of deterrence, rehabilitation, or retribution.”

Idahoﬂa
Idaho

1,

8,

895—§96, 392 P.3d

ﬂat

1236—237jm

368 P.3d 621, 628 (2015)).

consideration

is

It

is

protection 0f society, and that

State V. Hunnel, 125 Idaho 623, 627,

T0 impose a ﬁxed

life

9

State V. Bailey, 161

(quoting State V. McIntosh, 160

well established that the primary sentencing

all

other factors

must be subservient

to that end.

873 P.2d 877, 881 (1994).

sentence “requires a high degree of certainty that the perpetrator

could never safely be released back into society 0r that the nature 0f the offense requires that the
individual spend the rest 0f his

life

behind bars.” State

V.

Carver, 155 Idaho 489, 496, 314 P.3d

171, 178 (2013) (emphasis omitted) (quoting State V. Stevens, 146 Idaho 139, 149, 191 P.3d 217,

227 (2008)).
that

A

sentencing court

some ﬁxed sentence

murder

is

may

abuse

its

discretion

in excess of the statutory

when

minimum

an inadequate ﬁxed term for any murder.

E

it

states, as a

general principle,

10-year sentence for second—degree

State V. Izaggirre, 145 Idaho 820, 824—

825, 186 P.3d 676, 680-681 (Ct. App. 2008).
In this case, prior to imposing sentence, the district court cited and discussed the

appropriate sentencing factors, expressly recognized

its

discretionary authority t0

make

a

sentencing determination, and noted the statutory range of permissible sentences for second-

degree murder. (5/1/19

Tr.,

p.257,

L22 — p.258, L24.)

After discussing the facts 0f the crimes,

mitigating factors, Lopez’s mental health issues, and the court’s conclusion that

high risk to the community

if

he were to ever be released, the

sentence for second-degree murder, a consecutive 25-year

district court

Lopez posed a

imposed a ﬁxed-life

ﬁxed sentence

for second-degree

kidnapping, and a concurrent ﬁve-year ﬁxed sentence for aggravated assault. (5/1/19 Tr., p.256,

L.16 — p.290, L.24.)

The

A review of the record supports the district court’s determinations.

district court

reasonably exercise

its

took great care to obtain sufﬁcient information from which

discretion

and impose appropriate sentences.

it

could

The court conducted a

lengthy sentencing hearing which included testimony from four witnesses and Victim impact

(E

statements from several other individuals.

generally 5/1/19 Tr.)

Prior t0 the sentencing

hearing, the court granted Lopez’s request t0 retain psychological and forensic experts t0 prepare

reports

and appear

at

sentencing hearing, at the county’s expense. (R., V01.

I,

pp.156—157.) The

court additionally ordered that a separate psychological evaluation be conducted pursuant to I.C.

§

19-2522 after concluding that Lopez’s mental condition would be a signiﬁcant factor

sentencing. (12/20/18 Tr., p.47, L.15

— p.48,

The court took a guarded approach

at

L.14.)

in processing all

0f the information presented t0

it

in

an attempt not to unduly prejudice Lopez. For example, consistent with Lopez’s request (5/1/19
Tr.,

p.193, L.11

—

p.198, L.14), but contrary t0 the state’s wishes, the court did not give any

weight t0 the preliminary hearing testimony 0f Jorge Carillo,
the

murder (5/1/19

Lopez

told him,

Tr.,

p.264, L.22

0n the way

t0 the

—

p.265, L24).

murder scene,

that

Who was

Carillo testiﬁed,

With Lopez

among

at the

time 0f

other things, that

he was planning on killing Nallely and any

man

she

was seeing who may be With

her.

(PH

Tr., p.89,

found that a statement made by Lopez several years
not demonstrate a

made
L.4.)

literal intent to kill

in the course

The court

formed

L.16

earlier that

at that time, but

—

he was going t0

was

information that

needed

it

t0 analyze, the court also

Tr., p.267,

L.23

Importantly, the district court

second—degree murder.

Tr., p.255,

L.11

— p.256,

it

L.12.)

had reviewed the

which, as noted above, held that a ﬁxed-life sentence

requires a high degree of certainty that the perpetrator could never be released

back

0r that the nature 0f the offense requires that the individual spend the rest of his

(5/1/19 Tr., p.188, Ls.15-23.)

The court referenced other Idaho

the appropriateness of ﬁxed-life sentences.

expressly clear that

it

it,

life

into society

behind bars.

appellate precedent discussing

(5/1/19 TL, p.258, L.13

—

p.259, L.16.)

was—fn imposing a ﬁxed-life sentence in

particular circumstances warranted

(5/1/19 Tr.,

a ﬁxed-life sentence for

that prior t0 the sentencing hearing,

M,

this case

The court

because the

not simply because Lopez committed second-degree

murder:
This was Violent, and the nature 0f the harm caused was extreme.
that sense a substantial sentence is required for justice in light

but that does not automatically lead to either a
sentence.

result

life

So

I

think in

of the killing and —

sentence or a

ﬁxed

life

to be present for that. This was a serious offense.
0f killing somebody 0r ultimately resulted in killing somebody

Other things need

The ultimate

p.269,

determination and the amount of

was not ﬁxated on imposing

The court noted

Idaho Supreme Court opinion in

its

—

took a recess between the parties’ sentencing

arguments and the imposition of its sentences. (5/1/19

made

Vargas did

kill

also expressly considered Lopez’s youth to be a mitigating factor.

Further, in recognition of the gravity of

court also

instead merely a statement

of “an incident Where emotions ran high.” (5/1/19

p.259, Ls.17-25).

then

The

p.90, L.17).

[sic] that

can never be ﬁxed. So

think protection 0f the public interest and those

I

considerations suggest a substantial sentence but, again, don’t automatically lead
t0 the

maximum possible

I

ﬁnd

sentence.

that the sentence

is

appropriate based on a high degree of certainty

you can never be safely released back into society. I think the nature of the
offense suggests that that is an appropriate sentence but I’m not ﬁnding that the

that

nature of the offense automatically
life

means

that.

I’m not sentencing you

to

ﬁxed

based on just the nature of this.

(5/1/19 Tr., p.283, L.20

— p.284,

L.7; p.286, L.20

— p.287,

L.2.)

A review of the facts of Lopez’s crimes support the sentences imposed. On the day of the
murder, Nallely met With Lopez in Rupert to drop off their daughter.
p.34,

Later that day, Lopez repeatedly contacted Nallely and

L20.)

whereabouts.

up

(5/1/19 Tr., p.30, L.21

(5/1/19 Tr., p.35, L.24

their daughter

—

Lopez then

p.36:, L.23.)

because he had plans that night. (5/1/19

demanded

told Nallely to

Tr., p.36,

t0

know

—

her

come and pick

L.24 — p.37, L.5.) Nallely

brought her father with her t0 the planned exchange because she did not feel safe doing so alone.
(5/1/19 Tr., p.38, Ls.12-16.)

daughter for the night after

home.

Along

all.

the way,

Lopez

(5/1/19 Tr., p.40, L.19

(5/1/19 Tr., p.41, Ls.10-11.)

— p.41,

was going

keep

their

L.9.) Nallely started heading

back

told Nallely that he

However, before she could get home, a car heading

Nallely’s direction swerved in front 0f her, forcing her t0 h@kibrealesuddenly.

p.42, Ls.13-23.)

to

Nallely saw Lopez exit the vehicle With a gun in his hand.

in

(5/1/19 Tr.,

(5/1/19 Tr., p.43,

Ls.19-22.)

Lopez approached Nallely’s vehicle on
father, sat.

(PSI, p.23.)

the passenger side,

where Vargas, Nallely’s

Lopez threatened Nallely and Vargas, pointed

his

gun

at

them, and

ordered them out of the

car.

hands were shaking With

(Id.)

fear.

Nallely tried t0 call 911 but dropped her phone because her

(5/1/19 Tr., p.44, Ls.3-6.)

broke out the car Window by striking
Vargas.

(Id.)

it

Lopez ordered Nallely

When they did not leave the

several times With the gun.

into the

back

seat

Lopez then shot

(PSI, p.23.)

and then drove her vehicle away.

Lopez’s and Nallely’s daughter was present in the vehicle Lopez arrived
p.291, Ls.1-9.)

Lopez

car,

(Id.)

(E 5/1/19

in.

Lopez’s shooting of Vargas was committed under no provocation or

threat,

Tr.,

and

was not based upon some momentary 0r ﬂeeting heat 0f passion.
The
east

her.

initial

shooting did not end the ordeal. Lopez drove Nallely and the

dump

of Minidoka where he told Nallely that he was going t0
(PSI, p.24.)

this drive,

Vargas’s body and then

Nallely tried to convince Lopez to

L.22 — p.49, L.8.) Lopez instead pointed his gun

Tr., p.48,

Ls.8-9.)

During

at

wounded Vargas

her call 91

let

Vargas’ head.

1.

kill

(5/1/19

(5/1/19 Tr., p.49,

Nallely grabbed Lopez’s hand, and Lopez ﬁred the gun, striking Nallely in her hand.

(5/1/19 p.49, Ls.10-19.)

Lopez stopped the car and consulted with Jorge
vehicle at the scene 0f the

pp.23-24.)

When Lopez

initial

call

her

if

Lopez

Who was

previously in Lopez’s

followed Nallely’s vehicle.

phone and shot

also told Nallely to close her eyes,

and

it

(PSI,

multiple times.

that Carillo

would

she opened them. (5/1/19 Tr., p.52, Ls.4-18.) Eventually, Lopez permitted Nallely t0

911 from a

cell

phone

that

However, Lopez told Nallely
kill

who had now

returned, he took Nallely’s cell

(5/1/19 Tr., p.51, Ls.13-25.)

kill

shooting, and

Carillo,

her and her family.

was

in his possession.

that if she told the police

(5/1/19 Tr., p.52, L.22

—

(5/1/19 Tr., p.53, L.16

what had happened,

Carillo

—

p.55, L.3.)

was going

t0

p.53, L.2.) Nallely told 911 dispatch the story

that she

had Lopez had agreed upon —

home and had

that

shot her and her father.

two other individuals had attacked her car 0n her way

(5/1/19 Tr., p.55, Ls.1-13.)

Lopez drove Nallely and

Vargas towards Rupert where they eventually came into contact with the responding ambulance.
(5/1/19 Tr., p.55, L.14

— p.57,

L.8.)

Nallely was treated for her injury.

Where he

died.

in his head.

(Id.)

(PSI, p.24.)

Vargas was life-ﬂighted

t0 Pocatello

Vargas had been shot three times and had about ﬁve wounds, including two

(5/1/19 T11, p.89, L.25

—

p.91, L.6.)

Lopez’s Violent criminal acts were horriﬁc,

occurred over an extended period 0f time, and warranted the sentences imposed by the

district

court.

Prior t0 these incidents,

pp.30-31.)

However,

in the course

Which predicted future Violent behavior.

also described Lopez’s verbal

their daughter

At

—

p.267,

the sentencing hearing, Nallely

(5/1/19 Tr., p.14, L.15

and physical abuse — including

times and punched her in the face.
after

(ﬂ PSI,

of his relationship with Nallely demonstrated an escalating

described Lopez’s controlling and jealous nature.

February 2018,

history.

as the district court properly recognized (5/1/19 Tr., p.266, L.9

L22), Lopez’s conduct
pattern 0f abuse

Lopez did not have an extensive criminal

(5/1/19 Tr., p.17, L.18

how
—

—

p.15, L.10.) Nallely

he had choked her multiple

p.18, L.23; p.83, Ls.6-12.)

Lopez and Nallely had broken up and while joint custody arrangements

were being worked

(5/1/19 Tr., p.22, L.24

—

out,

p.25, L.19.)

Lopez cocked the gun. (5/1/19

Lopez pulled out a gun and asked

When

In

for

t0 see Nallely’s phone.

Nallely told Lopez that her phone was in her car,

Tr., p.26, Ls.2-7.)

Lopez’s Violent crimes had a profound impact on Nallely and her family.

Widow

impact statement, Vargas’s

described the physical, economic, and emotional impact 0f

the crimes and expressed her fear for her family’s safety should

(PSI, p.25; 5/1/19 Tr., p.174,

father,

how

attacks,

it

and

was months

how

L22 — p.178,

after the

Lopez be released from custody.

L22.) Nallely described the impact of the

murder before she was able

—

p.171, L.13.)

— p.163, L23.)

life

appeal,

Lopez contends

(PSI, p.26;

t0 the murder.

Several of Vargas’s siblings, and his son,

provided Victim impact statements as well. (PSI, pp.82-91; 5/1/19

On

of her

Vargas’s mother described her pain and grief and the

Vargas had with Lopez about Lopez’s abuse 0f Nallely leading up

(PSI, pp.27—28; 5/1/19 Tr., p.158, L.18

loss

to drive at night Without panic

she had taken her daughter to counseling following the incident.

5/1/19 Tr., p.167, L.17

altercations that

In her Victim

that the sentencing goal

Tr.,

p.164, L.4

— p.167,

L.16.)

0f deterrence did not require a ﬁxed-

sentence because his crimes were not rational, and thus no punishment could deter similar

irrational conduct.

Lopez’s crimes

(Appellant’s brief, pp.5-6.)

at the

sentencing hearing.

agreed that Lopez’s crimes were
character.

(Id.)

irrational acts

Indeed,

it

is

irrational,

The

district court

discussed the irrationality of

(5/1/19 TL, p.288, L.20

—

p.290, L2.)

The court

but also found that they were entirely Within Lopez’s

Lopez’s character Which makes him susceptible to committing

0f Violence when he

is

stressed or angry.

This

is

why the

district court

reasonably

concluded that the most important sentencing goal — protection 0f the community — warranted
the ﬁxed-life sentence imposed.

Lopez

also contends that the district court’s sentencing determinations failed to recognize

any possibility of

rehabilitation.

(Appellant’s brief, pp.6-7.)

10

However, there

is

nothing in the

including

record,

the

determination, indicating that

rehabilitation.

court’s

district

it

well-reasoned

preceding

analysis

its

did not consider the possibility that Lopez could be amendable t0

of its discretion, determined “as

Instead, the court, through a reasonable exercise

a practical matter,” that Lopez would

still

be a risk to society even

treatment available. (5/1/19 TL, p.287, L.23

—

p.288, L.9.)

It is

if

he had access to the best

recommendation made during the sentencing hearing, and instead focused

memorandum
his

mitigation based 0n his mental health issues and the irrationality of his actions.

amendable

Tr.,

p.219, L.5

— p.254,

L.13.) In fact, rather than argue that

community supervision and

to Idaho-based

rehabilitation,

L.23

—

that,

upon

p.252,

release,

L20;

parole? Absolutely not. Because once again,

Your Honor, even

He’ll be in another country for the rest 0f his 1ife.”)
court’s observations,

Lopez

is

life in

I,

Lopez would be
that

he would

States, implicitly

he would not be a danger to the people 0f Idaho. (5/1/19

p.254, Ls.9-13 (“Should he be given

or

argument on

(E R. V01.

Lopez noted

be deported upon release without the possibility 0f returning t0 the United
arguing

Lopez himself

also notable that

did not substantially argue about his rehabilitative prospects in his sentencing

pp.177—189; 5/1/19

sentencing

Tr., p.251,

prison without the possibility 0f
if he gets out,

Based upon these

he won’t be here.

representationsm

not a candidate for Idaho-based community supervision and

rehabilitation.

On

appeal,

Lopez

also referenced the remorse he expressed at the sentencing hearing

to the presentence investigator.

(Appellant’s brief, pp.9-10.)

that the district court failed to consider

fact that

Lopez

also told

However, there

Lopez’s asserted remorse.

PSI investigator

that that his

11

To

is

and

no indication

the contrary, despite the

gun simply “went off” the moment he

broke the car Window (PSI, p.29), and that Vargas then “tried t0 ﬁght With him” resulting in the

gun ﬁring again

in the car

because

“did not have a safety”

it

(id.),

the district court generously

concluded that these statements did not constitute a deliberate attempt to mislead the court, and
instead

may have been

Ls. 10-25).

The court

a result 0f Lopez’s impaired recollection of events (5/1/19 Tr., p.270,

further found that

Lopez had

the fact does not prevent a future crime, and

it

“real

remorse” — but that such “remorse

after

sure doesn’t bring the Victim back here.” (5/1/19

TL, p.274, Ls.1 1-18.) The court also referenced portions of the investigative and psychological
reports prepared for sentencing,

(5/1/19 T12, p.1 13, L.4

— p.1 14,

and testimony from Dr. Daniel Traughber (one 0f the evaluators)
L.5; p.121, L.14

— p.122, L8),

a “pattern” 0f anger and outbursts that were followed
p.276, L.6; p.283, Ls.15-17).

Thus,

it

was reasonable

Lopez was prone

t0

(5/1/19 Tr., p.273, L.20

—

indicating that

by remorse

for the court not t0 consider Lopez’s

asserted remorse as a signiﬁcant mitigating factor.

Finally,

Lopez appears

t0

contend that the

should have considered his

district court

mental health, anxiety, and stressful upbringing as mitigating factors warranting a lesser
sentence.

(Appellant’s brief, pp.6-8.)

However, a review of the sentencing hearing

transcript

reveals that the district court considered Lopez’s mental health issues and discussed

length.

The court

stated that “what’s clear is that mental health

going t0 have to consider

how

is

an issue here, and the [c]ourt

that factors into the sentence,”

substantial factor in this sentence.”

and

The court found

(5/1/19 Tr., p.260, Ls.14-20.)

this

testimony and Dr. Traughber’s report

12

at

at

is

that “mental health is a

Traughber’s sentencing hearing testimony was “very important.” (5/1/19

The court then discussed

them

Tr.,

some

that Dr.

p.273, Ls.20-21.)

length.

(5/1/19 Tr.,

—

p.273, L.20

p.278, L.4.)

The

fact that

Lopez now wishes

information about his mental health presented t0

ﬂ

discretion.

district court

it

weighed the

differently does not demonstrate an abuse 0f

State V. Porter, 130 Idaho 772, 789,

may

that the district court

948 P.2d 127, 144 (1997) (holding

that a

permissibly consider mental health problems as either an aggravating 0r

mitigating factor at sentencing).
Further, the record does not paint a promising picture of Lopez’s ability t0

any mental health treatment program.
depression, and

helpful.

was prescribed medication, but then discontinued use

(PSI, pp.7, 37, 52; 5/1/19 Tr., p.61, L.4

substances t0 address his anxiety and
hearing, Dr. Traughber testiﬁed that
“long, lifelong problem” caused

symptoms

start t0

situations.

L.12.)

issues

Lopez previously sought treatment

PTSD

district court

after deciding

Lopez instead

relied

it

and

wasn’t

upon

illicit

such as that suffered by Lopez tends t0 be a

a “permanent change to the brain,’

reduce, they can develop again

—

p.62, L.1.)

for anxiety

problems. (Conf. Exhibits} p.6.) At the sentencing

complex

by

(5/1/19 TL, p.110, L.8

The

mood

—

comply With

When

the individual

p.114, L.5; p.123, L.21

—

9

that

even when

exposed

t0 stressful

and

is

p.124, L.5; p.128, L.12

—

p.129,

referenced this testimony in determining that Lopez’s mental health

were an aggravating factor

in this case.

(5/1/19 Tr., p.273, L.20

-

p.275, L.9; p.279, Ls.5-

7.)

In light of

discretion t0

3

The

all

0f the factors discussed above, the

district court

acted well within

impose a ﬁxed-life sentence, consecutive 25-year ﬁxed sentence, and concurrent

state’s citation to the

its

5-

“Conf. Exhibits” refers t0 the electronic ﬁle containing Lopez’s

psychological evaluations.

13

year ﬁxed sentence, respectively, upon Lopez’s guilty pleas t0 second-degree murder, second-

degree kidnapping, and aggravated assault.
district court

abused

its

Lopez has therefore

failed to demonstrate that the

This Court should therefore afﬁlm the

sentencing discretion.

district

court’s sentencing determinations.

CONCLUSION
The

state respectfully requests this

Court to afﬁrm the sentencing determinations 0f the

district court.

DATED this 23rd day of March, 2020.
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MARK W. OLSON
/s/

Deputy Attorney General

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I

HEREBY CERTIFY that I have this 23rd day of March,

copy of the foregoing
File and Serve:

RESPONDENT’S BRIEF

2020, served a true and correct

to the attorney listed

ANDREA W. REYNOLDS
DEPUTY STATE APPELLATE PUBLIC DEFENDER
documents@sapd.state.id.us

/s/

Mark W. Olson

MARK W. OLSON
Deputy Attorney General

14

below by means 0f iCourt

